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     John Breen, Professor at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in 
Kyoto, published Girei To Kenryoku: Tennō No Meiji Ishin (August 2011, Heibonsha 
sensho, the following citations in this article with page numbers only refer to this 
book).  This book compiles eight articles that Breen wrote on the modern emperors 
and shrines between 1995 and 2009. 
   The introduction and chapters one through three examine the influence of 
various rituals on power relations from the viewpoint of ritual theory.  The rituals 
examined are the Meiji Emperor’s visit to the Ise Grand Shrines in Meiji 2 (1869), 
the Shogun (General) Iemochi’s procession to Kyoto and audience with Emperor 
Kōmei in Bunkyū 3 (1863), the ritual oath,  (The Imperial Oath consisting of five 
articles [五カ条の御誓文]) in Keiō 4 (1868), and diplomatic rituals that the Meiji 
Emperor performed.  
 Chapters four through six “explore the new meanings attached to Shinto and 
shrines at the beginning of the modern era through their connection with the 
emperor,” (p.18), and discuss topics including the separation of Buddhism and 
Shinto, Ōkuni Takamasa’s view of Christianity (Tenshukyō, 天主教), and the Hie 
Shrine’s spring festival, sannō matsuri(山王祭). 
  In the addendum, Breen considers the Yasukuni Shrine(靖国神社)as a site of 
memory and claims that the history narrated at this site is “extremely biased and 
distorted” (p. 264).  This article aims to closely investigate his book.   
 
I.  Standpoint and Methodology of This Article 
 
     The main focus of this article is to closely investigate Breen’s methodology.  From 
my viewpoint, he first surveys a targeted topic and instinctively determines what he 
believes to be the most important event related to the topic and his evaluation of 
that event. Then, Breen collects whatever theories and examples necessary to justify 
his conclusion, and uses them to formulate his articles.  It is common among 
scholars to set up a hypothesis in the beginning; however, the problem with Breen's 
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work is that he avoids examining theories and examples that oppose his pre-
determined conclusions.  Instead of dealing with those theories and examples 
appropriately, he picks and chooses, hiding them, ignoring them, and rewriting them 
differently.  In so doing, he skips the troublesome process of logical validation and 
ends up doing the very thing that he questions in criticizing the Yasukuni Shrine—
“selecting memories.” 
     Critiquing his argument without looking at the problems of his methodology 
would be as difficult as trying to correct the reflection in a distorted mirror without 
correcting the distortion of the mirror itself.  Thus, this article closely scrutinizes 
issues embedded in his methodology that distort his discussion, and reveals a 
succession of facts hidden from readers’ eyes.   
 
II. “Invention” (misrepresentation) of  Contents of Eric Santner’s Article 
 
     It is Breen’s “narrative” about Eric Santner’s scholarly work, applied to support 
his argument in the addendum, that clearly shows the problems with Breen's 
methodology.  Breen introduces Santner’s scholarly work as a standard for 
evaluating the war memory narrated by Yasukuni Shrine and states as follows: 
 
The reflections on war memory by French historian Eric Santner are 
suggestive here.  Santner’s attention has focused on museums and memorials 
of post-war France.  He points out that, whether they are museums built by 
Gaullists or memorials sponsored by Communists, they have all failed equally. 
They have failed in that they have worked to suppress the trauma of the war 
experience, of defeat, of occupation and of collaboration.  Santner 
acknowledges that it is of course not only post-war France that cannot or will 
not accept historical trauma; many other post-war societies face a similar 
situation to some extent.  According to Santner, since war memory is too 
painful to endure, they suppress it and deploy mnemonic strategies in order 
to ensure the suppression.  Santner refers to these strategies, or ‘myth 
production’ as ‘narrative fetishism.’ (pp. 279-280) 
 
     According to Breen, the history that the Yasukuni Shrine narrates “falls under the 
very category of ‘narrative fetishism’ that Santner claims” (p. 280).   
     However, what corresponds to the contents of Santner’s article in Breen’s 
accounts cited above is only the fact that Santner uses the term “narrative fetishism.”  
The rest of Breen’s descriptions are his invention.  Santner is not French.  The article 
of Santner's which Breen refers to, “History beyond the Pleasure Principle,” is not a 
study of a French war memorial but a discourse on the issues that German society 
faces after the Holocaust. 
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     It is hard to believe that Breen fabricates the contents of another scholars’ work 
and uses them as the base of his argument.  I thought that it might be the case that 
Santner writes about French war memorials not in “History beyond the Pleasure 
Principle,” but in another his article, and that Breen might have mistakenly referred 
to “History beyond the Pleasure Principle” in the endnote.  I contacted Santner 
through a friend to determine the truth of this matter. 
 
Date: July 4, 2011 7:30pm 
 
1) Are you a French critic? 
 
John Breen is, as you may know, one of well-known British scholars on Shinto.  In 
the volume, he mentions you as the French critic--"French critics like Eric 
Santner".  He quotes that you write of French postwar museums that fail because 
they suppress the trauma of the war experience of defeat, occupation and 
collaboration.  John Breen tries to apply your famous concept of 'narrative fetishism' 
to the case of issues of Yasukuni shrine in Japan.  I wonder if John Breen's 
description you as the French critic is correct or a mistake.  Are you a French? 
 
2)  Did you write about a French museum? 
 
In your article of "History beyond the Pleasure Principle: Thoughts on the 
Representation of Trauma," the main context is Nazis' Holocaust not French 
museum, right? … I would like to ask a question of if you wrote about the French 
museum often or not.  Some portions of your articles are available online, so I read 
them, but I did not find your writing about the French museum. 
 
I am asking this question because I felt a little bit strange that despite the strong 
context of Holocaust in your article, your concept of "narrative fetishism" is 
introduced by John Breen without mentioning the Holocaust at all.  In stead, he cites 
the French Museum's failure as an example when your article was mentioned. 
 
Santner responded to this question as follows: 
 
Date July 6, 2011 1:56:19 pm  
 
Thanks for your letter. No, I am not French! I am an American, born in New York 
City. I don't recall ever having written about a French museum. Strange!!! 
 
     As far as I know, Girei to Kenryoku is the fourth time that Breen mentions 
Santner’s particular article in his writings: “Yasukuni ― Rekishikioku no Keisei to 
Soushitu (Yasukuni: the Formation and Loss of Historical Memory, Sekai 2006 
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no.756),”   “Yasukuni and the Loss of Historical Memory (Yasukuni: the War Dead 
and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, HURST, 2007)”, and “Taiheiyō no torauma: 
Yasukuni jinja niyoru sensōgatari no fetishism (Traumas in the Pacific: The 
Fetishism of Yasukuni Shrine’s Narrative on War)” (Higashi Kentarō’s Japanese 
translation is available online).  The third article seemes to be written somewhere 
between 2007 and 2011.   Even once is unusual to misrepresent a main article cited 
as a central base of argument, but this misrepresentation has continued four times 
during the last five years.  
     Besides, Breen did not admit it when I first time pointed out his 
misrepresentation of Santner’s scholarly work in Shintō Forum (Jan.15,2012 vol. 43, 
p.7) as followes: 
 
According to Wikipedia, Eric Santner is an American scholar and a Professor 
of Department of Germanic Studies at the University of Chicago, specializing 
in Modern Germanic Studies.  His writing covers literature and 
psychoanalysis, religion and philosophy.  It deals with German poetry, post-
war Germany, and the Holocaust.  It is true that Santner published an article 
“History beyond the Pleasure Principle,” but its primary concern is not 
French museums, as you can determine from the subtitle of the book 
containing Santner’s article—“Nazism and ‘the Final Solution’.”  Santner’s 
main theme in the article is “the project and the dilemma of elaborating a 
post-Holocaust German national and cultural identity” (Santner 1992, p.145), 
and Santner does not refer to French memorial museums at all. 
 
     In response to this account, Breen criticized that Nitta “turns his back on 
Santner’s argument itself” and repeatedly stated: 
 
 Santner investigated war museums and memorials of post-war Europe and 
wrote the stimulating article about the narrative on war of these museums. 
In conclusion, he said, ways of narrating war were closely related to the 
trauma of defeat, occupation, and so forth (Shintō Forum Jan.15,2012 vol. 
43. p.7).   
 
Upon seeing this uncorrected repetition, I cannot help thinking that Breen’s 
misrepresentation of Santner is not a careless mistake, but an absolutely intentional 
one.   
     What I question here is not just the fact that Breen fabricates the contents of 
Santner’s article.  A problem is that this fabrication is designed to hide the 
significant issue from readers, which allows Breen to avoid the difficult task of 
validating his argument.  Santner’s theory of “narrative fetishism” deals with the 
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trauma produced by the genocide executed to Jews what is called the Holocaust. 
However horror wars are, you cannot apply Santner’s theory on the Holocaust to 
“war memory” in general right away.  
 
 If it is applicable, you should explain why and how it is possible. Breen himself 
needs to explain and prove how Santner’s theory is applicable to war memory.  But, 
he avoids taking accountability for establishing his argument and fabricates the 
fictitious content of Santner’s article including the war experience and the trauma of 
post-war France as well as French war museums as the device of suppressing the 
trauma.  By doing so, Breen acts as if it is unquestionably possible to apply Santner’s 
concept directly to the Yasukuni Shrine.   
 
III. Concealing Fukuchi Gen’ichirō’ s “words” 
 
     Have you remembered I stated in the chapter one, “Instead of dealing with those 
theories and examples appropriately, Breen picks and chooses, hiding them, 
ignoring them, and rewriting them differently.”?  One typical example is his way of 
citing Bakufu Suibōron (The Theory of Shogunate’s Decline, 幕府衰亡論) written by 
Fukuchi Gen’ichirō(福地源一郎).   
 
     Breen argues in the first chapter “Kōmei seikenron—Shōgun no jōraku to kokka 
girei no saihensei (the Argument of the Emperor Kōmei regime—the Shogun’s 
Procession to  Kyoto and Reorganization of State Rituals, 孝明政権論—将軍の上洛
と国家儀礼の再編成)” of Girei to Kenryoku (The author of this article underlines the 
following citations) as follows:  
 
Bunkyū 3 (1863) is an extremely important year for analysis of the last days 
of the Shogunate from a perspective of ritual theory.  I make this claim not 
because of the Coup of 18th August that has attained much scholarly attention, 
but because of the Shogun Iemochi’s procession to Kyoto and  audience with 
Emperor Kōmei at the Imperial Court.  The fact that the Shogun left Edo 
Castle and proceeded to Kyoto actually ended sankin kōtai (regional lords’ 
alternating residence between Edo and their domain, 参勤交代) and was the 
catalyst for the collapse of early modern power relations.  Afterwards, 
leading local lords (有力藩主) got together in Kyoto and received audience 
with the emperor, through which new power relations were formed.  I claim 
that the Shogun’s epoch-making procession to Kyoto, which has been hardly 
studied, brought about a totally new (albeit temporary) polity (pp.16-17). 
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According to Breen, from a viewpoint of ritual theory, the Shogun Iemochi’s 
procession to Kyoto in the year of Bunkyū 3 was the decisive event in the formation 
of new power relations centering on the emperor.  
     This first chapter is an extension of Breen’s book review (Shinto Shūkyō 2002: vol. 
184-185) of Ishinki Tennō Saishi no Kenkyū (A Study of Imperial Rituals before and 
after The Meiji Restoration, 維新期天皇祭祀の研究) by Takeda Hideaki.  In his 
review, Breen states that rituals are “the most important opportunity not only to 
demonstrate power relations but also to shape and produce them” (p. 125).  Breen 
regards these rituals as “epoch-making” including “the 14th Shogun Iemochi’s 
procession to the Imperial Court, received an audience with the Emperor and 
bestowed an imperial wine-cup”, and continues to say that “it is clear that the power 
relations between the emperor, the shogun, and various feudal lords was drastically 
reorganized” (p. 125).   
     In this chapter, Breen uses various sources to prove his argument, among which 
there are two main ones:  Fukuchi Gen’ichirō’s words as historical materials and 
Edward Shils’ theory of “Center and Periphery”.   
    Breen introduces Fukuchi Gen’ichirō’s words as follows: 
 
I will borrow Fukuchi Gen’ichirō’s words to examine what the Shogun’s 
procession to Kyoto for the first time in 230 years means to the Shogunate.  
This procession signifies “the decline of the Shogunate,” “the surrender,” and 
“the sign of weakness.”  Fukuchi concludes that “230 years ago, the power of 
the Shogunate both in name and in reality was solidified by the procession, 
but, today, both are lost altogether through the procession” (p. 66). 
 
     Those who read this citation would think that Fukuchi, who was an interpreter of 
the Shogunate and later wrote Bakufu suibōron , claimed that the Shogun’s 
procession to Kyoto was decisive for reshaping power relations between the 
emperor, the Shogun, and feudal lords.   
     However, this is not true.  What Fukuchi considers as the decisive factor for the 
decline of the Shogunate is the fact that the Shogunate accepted, in Bunkyū 2(1862), 
the imperial demand delivered by imperial messenger to Edo.  By accepting it, the 
Shogunate ended up appointing Hitotsubashi Yoshinobu (一橋慶喜) as the Shogunal 
regent (Shōgun Kōkenshoku, 将軍後見職) and Matsudaira Yoshinaga (松平慶永) as 
the Shogunal prime minister (Seiji Sōsaishoku, 政事総裁職).  This also decided the 
Shogun’s procession to Kyoto.  In brief, in Fukuchi’s view, the definitive factor is the 
fact that the Shogunate followed such an imperial order as had demanded political 
reformation.  I will cite the corresponding part from Fukuchi’s Bakufu suibōron 
(1967. Tōyōbunko, Heibonsha).   
 
The fact that the Shogunate has held real political power is obvious from the 
emperor’s statement of entrusting the Shogun with politics.  Moreover, the 
Shogunate has been the central government for more than two hundred fifty 
years.  However, the Shogunate was instructed by Kyoto (the Imperial Court) 
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to ask for the emperor’s permission regarding diplomatic relations and to 
proceed to Kyoto with daimyō (大名 regional lords) for discussing at the 
Imperial Court.  Furthermore, the Imperial Court interfered in the political 
affairs of the Shogunate, and ordered the creation of the Council of Five 
Elders or committee of daimyō (Gotairō, 五大老) and the appointment of 
Hitotsubashi (Yoshinobu) as the shogunal regent and Echizen (Matsudaira 
Yoshinaga) as the shogunal prime minister.  How can the Shogunate maintain 
its real political power under this situation?  Although it is not so obvious on 
the surface, this Imperial command is nothing but the order to return the 
Shogunate’s political power to the Imperial Court (p. 136).  
Upon facing this imperial order, if the shogunate wants to continue to seize 
real power, it has no choice but to reject this command (p. 137).   
In my view, it was not when the 15th Shogun Yoshinobu returned political 
power to the emperor, but when the 14th Shogun Iemochi accepted the 
Imperial order in the year of Bunkyū 2 that the Tokugawa Shogunate lost its 
power of ruling over the whole country.  From that moment, the decline and 
fall of the shogunate were accelerated. (p. 138) 
 
     Fukuchi considers the year of Bunkyū 2 (1862) most important and claims that 
the shogunate’s obedience to the imperial command was decisive.  However, Breen 
conceals this claim and makes it look like as if Fukuchi considers the Shogun’s 
procession to Kyoto in the following year the most significant event, despite being a 
mere consequence of secondary importance in Fukuchi’s view.   
     If Breen values objectivity and fairness, he should first convey Fukuchi’s words 
without hiding them to readers, and then explain why the Shogun’s procession to 
Kyoto in the year of Bunkyū 3 (1863) is decisive in his own words.  Concealment is 
not proof, but deception. 
     There is another possible reason why Breen fabricates as if Fukuchi views the 
shogun’s procession to Kyoto as the most important event.  It is because if Breen 
introduces Fukuchi’s words as they are to the readers, then they will contradict 
Breen’s “theory of ritual.”  Breen states that rituals are the most important 
opportunity not only to demonstrate power relations but also to shape and produce 
them.  On the contrary, in Fukuchi’s account, it was the political decision to follow 
the Imperial command that definitively formed this power relationship.  Rituals 
followed by the procession to Kyoto are merely the “demonstration” of power 
relations that were already determined; they are not the “most important 
opportunity” to produce and shape power relations.  In fact, Fukuchi states: “the 
procession to Kyoto discloses the fact that while the shogun is a political ruler, the 
Imperial Court is the supreme sovereign (p.148).”  By concealing the main point of 
historical materials written by Fukuchi, who held a view incompatible with Breen’s 
“theory of ritual,” Breen is simply pretending that Fukuchi’s historical materials 
support his theory.   
     Breen argues that the ritual—after proceeding to Kyoto, Shogun Iemochi had an 
audience with Emperor Kōmei in the Imperial Palace—was the decisive moment of 
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the Shogun’s “becoming an imperial vassal” (朝臣化) (p. 58).   In his view, before the 
ritual, although the shogun was a palace minister(内大臣) by the imperial 
proclamation, he would not have actually been conscious of being an imperial vassal.  
The ritual of the audience with the Emperor Kōmei served to display the Shogun as 
an imperial vassal (朝臣) for the first time (p. 60).  
     Is it really true that the Shogun was not conscious of being an “imperial vassal”?  
It would hardly be possible to think this true if one believes what Fukuchi says 
below: 
 
Over three hundred years, learning encouraged by the shogunate has shed 
light on the path of loyalty and filial piety, advanced social morality, and led 
to civilization.  At the same time, learning has taught that the Imperial Court 
is superior to the shogunate and is Japan’s true sovereign; thus, learning has 
enhanced a spirit of loyalty.  Besides, along with flourishing literature, many 
literary works, like Mito’s Dainihonshi (Great Japanese History, 大日本史) 
and Rai Sanyō’s Nihongaishi (頼山陽,History of Japan,日本外史), nurtured 
the spirit of loyalty.  In addition, since long before the era of the shogunate, it 
goes without saying that military chronicles, including the Genpei seisuiki(源
平盛衰記), the Heike monogatari(平家物語), and the Taiheik(太平記 i, 
fostered the spirit of loyalty.  Also, the novels and plays of Chikamatsu 
Monzaemon(近松門左衛門), Takeda Izumo(竹田出雲), and Takizawa 
Bakin(滝沢馬琴)  had an indirect role in forming the spirit of loyalty, and 
their influential power is evenly matched with that of the Nihongaishi.   
     Thus, the spirit of loyalty was nurtured from the beginning of the 
shogunate.  Moreover, shogun of all generations were encouraged revering 
the emperor.   
     If one sees only appearances—the shogunate limited the land owned by 
the Imperial Court to a little more than ten thousand goku (10 余万石, a size 
of land which is same as that of a middle rank lord) and forbade the Imperial 
Court from interfering with the shogunate politically—since these acts look 
like that the shogunate thought lightly of the Imperial Court,  many people 
might think that the shogunate did look down on the Imperial Court; 
however, this is completely false.  To begin with, the shogunate shows 
extreme reverence for the Imperial Court and treats imperial messengers 
honorably.  Also, when kōke or hereditary officials (高家, families who 
conduct rites and ceremonies for the Tokugawa Shogunate) report upon 
returning from Kyoto every year, the shogun receives a report in a same 
room with them.   (This is also the case for visiting Ise Grand Shrines and the 
Nikkō Shrine .)  Before delivering offerings to the Imperial Court, the shogun  
wears ceremonial clothes and looks at them.  Similarly, when the shogunate 
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receives a gift from the Imperial Court, the shogun never keeps it in their bed 
room.  The shogun’s deep reverence for the Imperial Court has something to 
do with the fact that a counselor has made the shogun believe that it is Kyoto  
that he should be afraid of. 
     When a chief retainer needs to remonstrate with his feudal lord, as the 
best way to approach, he would say, “if you are rebuked by the shogun, you 
will be in trouble.”  When a counselor of the shogun needs to advise the 
shogun, there are two effective phrases; “if your fault is found, it will be 
inexcusable toward Nikkō-sama (日光様, the first Shogun Ieyasu (家康) who 
is enshrined at Nikkō)”; and “if you are blamed by the Imperial Court, what 
would you do?” 
     Although Nikkō-sama is an ancestor whom the shogun reveres the most of 
all, its effective force is not so strong and as same as that of an ancestral 
tablet because Nikkō-sama is a deity that is not present in this world.  On the 
contrary, Kyoto (the emperor) is present in the Imperial Court; he bestows 
an official rank to the shogun and is more venerable than deities of heaven 
and earth in all sizes.  Thus, it is natural that the Imperial Court has more 
effective force than Nikkō-sama.   In the shogunate, all generations of the 
shogun have been most scared of the Imperial Court, because, through study 
or convention, they have been taught since they are small that if the Imperial 
Court were to declare the shogun as an enemy of the emperor, there would 
be no place for them to stay in this world.  With this teaching, the Shogun’s 
counselor makes the shogun sacred of the Imperial Court and uses Kyoto as 
an excuse to remonstrate with the shogun. (p. 819) 
 
     If one believes Fukuchi’s words, one should conclude that successive shogun were 
conscious of their status as vassals of the Imperial Court.  However, what I would 
like to say here is not that you should trust Fukuchi’s words but this; if Breen cites a 
portion of Fukuchi’s words as a basis of his argument, would it not be the case that 
he should also cite Fukuchi’s words that contradict his own claim and investigate 
further?  Otherwise, he is not fulfilling his accountability in quoting these words. 
 
IV. Misrepresentation of Edward Shils’ Theory  
 
     Breen refers to sociologist Edward Shils’ theory of center as “a key to the 
explanation of the historical meaning about the Shogun’s procession to Kyoto” (p. 
48).    
 
“The center” is 1) the space where the will of the nation is formed or related 
institutions exist, and 2) at the same time, a space of a dimension comprised 
of symbols that establish the authority of the state and individuals in power.  
Shils concludes that rituals that are characterized by symbols, and principles 
of order shaped by rituals make the center the center, and make the center 
the sacred space of a state.  Shils’ theory is very significant as the almost first   
theory that values “space” in history, especially political history.  In fact, 
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while Shils developed his theory with the purpose of exploring the “charisma” 
described by Max Weber, Shils’ conclusion on charisma should also be noted.  
Shils claims that it is the sacred center that functions to produce charisma. (p. 
49)  
 
     Based on this theory, Breen argues: “It is my main argument that, through the 
opportunity of the procession to Kyoto, the regime of Emperor Kōmei was created 
as a new form of a state, centered on Kyoto, the Imperial Court, and the emperor” (p. 
50).   
     I would like to draw attention to those underlined words.  If Breen’s introduction 
is correct, surely, Shils’ theory will correspond to Breen’s theory of ritual; thus it can 
be understood that Shils’ theory supports Breen’s view of valuing Kyoto as a spatial 
site that produces the new charisma.  However, does Shils really write as Breen 
says?  Due to Breen’s misrepresentation of Santner, I got suspicious and ordered 
Shils’ Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology (1975, The University of 






























    What becomes clear here is that through adding two major alterations to Shils’ 
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theory, Breen manipulates Shils’ theory to make it correspond to Breen’s view.  The 
first alteration is that Breen claims that Shils’ theory of the center, which is not 
necessarily restricted to space in essence,  is a theory that values space.  The second 
alteration is the reinterpretation of Shils’ conclusion.  Although Shils considers 
“beliefs and values” to be the important factors that shape the center and states that 
rituals and beliefs are separable, Breen hides this argument and wrongly presents 
Shils’ conclusion that it is rituals that make the center what it should be.  
     If Shils’ theory is correctly introduced, it does not support Breen’s “theory of 
ritual” but rather disproves or disregards the essential part of Breen’s argument—
the importance of “space” and “rituals.” 
 
V. Fabrication of a “common theory” 
 
     In the introduction of “Meiji Tennō wo yomu” (Reading the Meiji Emperor) in 
Girei to Kenryoku, Breen emphasizes Emperor Meiji’s visit to Ise Grand Shrines in 
March of the year of Meiji 2 (1869) as an “epoch-making event” (p. 27).  This is 
Breen’s main argument in this chapter: 
 
In a common theory, it is understood that the emperor as a representative of 
the myth of the unbroken imperial line appears after the promulgation of the 
Meiji Constitution” (p. 16).   
According to a commonly accepted view, it is around the time of completion 
of the Imperial Constitution and the Imperial Rescript of Education when the 
emperor, the state, and myths were all connected (p. 29). 
 However, the common view is not true; since the Emperor Meiji’s 
unprecedented visit to the Ise Grand Shrines, the emperor has been 
consistently situated as an embodiment of national mythologies (p. 40).   
 
     What is the most significant issue here is that as a premise for his argument, 
Breen assumes it as a “common theory” that it is after the promulgation of the Meiji 
Constitution that the emperor and the myths were connected.  I could not help being 
surprised at this.  In the past, it happened that elements other than myths were 
introduced to the rituals that an emperor conducts.  Although the degree of the 
connection between an emperor and myths has varied; however, has it ever 
happened that the link between the two became disconnected?  I have never heard 
such a “common view” that there was a period when an emperor and his rituals had 
nothing to do with myths.  Also, I do not know any such “common view” that it is 
after the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution when the emperor, the state, and 
myths were joined together. 
     So, I looked at Breen’s notes and found that three names were mentioned as 
representatives of this “common view”: Okudaira Yasuhiro, Hara Takeshi, and 
Masuda Tomoko (pp. 43-44).  What I first thought suspicious is the fact that both 
Okudaira Yasuhiro and Masuda Tomoko are jurists.  While I pondered that it is a 
little bit strange to present jurists’ writings as a “common view” concerning history, 
I thought “there might be some jurists who claim such a thing on history.”   Then, I 
read Okudaira Yasuhiro’s Banseiikkei no Kenkyū-“Kōshitsutenpannarumono” eno 
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Shiza (A Study on the “Unbroken Imperial Line”—a Viewpoint toward “the Imperial 
House Law-Related Matters” 「萬世一系」の研究—「皇室典範的なるもの」への
視座, Iwanamishoten 2005).  Okudaira Yasuhiro states:   
 
While putting aside some theory like ‘banseiikkei’ (the unbroken imperial 
line) advocated by loyalists during the shogunate period, if I speak 
exclusively based on the discourse on the Constitution, it is fine to consider 
that this concept originates in the Article 1 of the Meiji Constitution: “The 
emperor of the unbroken imperial line shall reign over and govern Imperial 
Japan.” (p. 4)  
 
     Okudaira states that he restricts argument on “the unbroken imperial line” within 
the discourse of the Constitution and does not take other matters before the Meiji 
Constitution into account.  This is by no means a sentence that claims the absence of 
the connection between the emperor and myths before the Meiji Constitution.  It 
should rather be understood that he affirms the presence of the connection between 
the emperor and myths before the Meiji Constitution because he recognizes the 
presence of theory of “the unbroken imperial line” during the shogunate period.   
     It is the same case in Masuda Tomoko’s Tennōsei to Kokka (the System of the 
Emperor and the State, 天皇制と国家, Aoki Shoten 1999).  I read the page of 
Masuda’s book indicated in Breen’s notes: 
 
Analysis of modern Japan in this book focuses on the constitutional 
monarchy under the emperor system, where the state and the ideology of 
“kokutai (the national constitution, 国体) of  “the unbroken imperial line” 
were connected, and grasps the structure of and changes in constitutional 
monarchy by applying the concept of taiken-seiji (大権政治, politics of 
Imperial prerogatives). (p. 25)  
 
     Masuda also states that modern Japan and a constitutional monarchy is the target 
of the analysis and like Okudaira, she doesn’t take other things before the 
establishment of the Meiji Constitution into account. 
 It is Breen’s alterations to “narrate” their discourses as the claim that it is after 
the establishment of the Meiji Constitution and the Imperial Rescript on Education 
that the emperor, the state, and the myths were linked.  In short, this introductory 
chapter fails to formulate an argument appropriately in the first place because the 
“common view”that Breen attempts to disprove is itself his fabrication. 
     Still, if Breen wants to argue that the link between the emperor and the myths 
began from Meiji Emperor’s visit to Ise Grand Shrines, he has to first prove the 
absence of the link between the two before the emperor’s visit to the shrines.  
However, he does not show any evidence for this.  It is natural why he does not.  It is 
self-evident for those who have researched even a little bit about the emperors that 
such attempts are meaningless.  There are abundant examples demonstrating the 
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connection between the emperor and the myths before Emperor Meiji’s visit to Ise 
Grand Shrines.  Reading the mikotonori (詔, the Imperial edict) of all emperors from 
the ancient to the modern period will be suggestive (Mikotonori, Kinseisha, 1995). 
     Upon observing how Breen writes, I cannot but think that he must assume that 
there are no readers who would examine the articles and historical materials that he 
uses as his basis.  Otherwise, he would not have been able to carry out such a series 
of interpolations and concealment. 
 
  
VI. Omitting Proof by Generalization and a Subliminal Method 
 
     Chapter 2 of Girei to Kenryoku focuses on the famous “Imperial Oath of Five 
Articles” (or Charter Oath, 五箇条の御誓文) and aims to “prove that the Imperial 
Oath functioned as a device for constructing power relations under ‘imperial rule’ 
after the restoration of imperial rule” (p. 87). 
     There are three aspects of the “construction of power relations” that Breen 
attempts to demonstrate here.  The first aspect is that “the purpose of the ritual of 
the Charter Oath (seisai girei, 誓祭儀礼) is to bestow supreme power to the Meiji 
Emperor by associating him with the first Emperor Jinmu” (p. 93).  This has already 
been pointed out by Takeda Hideaki in his Ishinki Tennōsaishi no Kenkyū (維新期天
皇祭祀の研究, A Study on the Emperor’s Rituals During the End of the Edo Period), 
among others, and basically I have no objection to this aspect of the argument. (1) 
     The second aspect is that “the Emperor who appears in rituals or imperial letters 
is the one whom Kido (木戸), Ōkubo (大久保), and Iwakura (岩倉) easily manipulate 
as they like; The Emperor’s political will is their will, and likewise, an ‘imperial rule’ 
with the emperor at its central core is also an ‘imperial rule’ manipulated by these 
men.”  In Breen’s view, those who attended the ritual of the Charter Oath were 
overwhelmed by the demonstration of the emperor’s authoritative power, which 
caused their “misrecognition” (p. 96).   As his basis for this discussion, Breen refers 
to Catherine Bell’s detailed analysis about “the function of rituals to cause 
misrecognition” (p. 118). 
     This is a manipulative alteration.  Even if a general theory asserts that rituals 
have such a function, Breen still needs to present concrete evidence in order to 
prove that it is applicable to this particular case.  However, he does not provide any 
historical data to prove that this “misrecognition” actually occurred.  No matter how 
magnificent the ritual was, common sense would tell us that it is impossible to 
assume that attendees of the ritual oath “misrecognized” that Emperor Meiji himself 
determined political matters, because the attendees were aware that the Emperor 
was a sixteen year-old boy.  If Breen thinks my common sense is irrelevant, then I 
would like him to present proof to verify the attendance’s “misrecognition.” 
     The third aspect of the “construction of power relations” is Breen's discussion of 
the group of nobles who were appointed to gijō (議定, a minister of state) and who 
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opposed Kido, Ōkubo, and Iwakura.  He claims that “the ritual of the Charter Oath 
acted to deprive this group of power” (p. 109).  Here, again, Breen does not present 
any historical materials at all to prove that the gijō group changed their opinions to 
obey Kido and others, or that the gijō group acted on their changed opinion. 
     Instead of providing historical data, Breen repeats his claim that “rituals 
construct power relations” subliminally and attempts to implant it in readers’ 
consciousness (lines 4, 5, 13 on p. 87, line 13 on p. 91, lines 6, 8 on p. 92, line 15 on p. 
96, line 10 on p. 110, and line 12 on p. 116: in total 9 repetitions among 31 pages in 
Chapter 2).   
     In this chapter, Breen refers to Ōkubo’s “proposal of transferring the national 
capital to Osaka” and Iwakura’s plan of “an Imperial tour to Osaka” (pp. 105-106, 
115).  Considering the relation to the introductory chapter, there are some 
questions that Breen should closely investigate but fails to do so.  How does not 
Breen interpret these phenomena in terms of Shils’ “theory of the center” (pp. 48-
49) and Geertz’ “theory of Imperial tours” (p. 60)?  How does not Breen interpret 
the fact that the capital was transferred from Kyoto to Tokyo as soon as Meiji 
Restoration took place?  Naturally, Breen should discuss these issues, but he 
addresses none of them.   
Regarding his way of citing sources, in most cases, Breen exploits theories 
disposably, applying each to an individual issue and then discarding it.  It seems that 
Breen does not interpret history consistently based on the effectiveness of some 
convincing theory; instead, he conveniently finds whatever theory appears to be 
able to support his viewpoint and uses it only as long as it suits his purpose.  Much 
less, Breen’s attitude and awareness of problems is so lacking that he attempts to 
examine the effectiveness and appropriateness of various theories in the light of 
concrete history of Japan.  
 
VII. Lack of Concern About Contradictions Between the Premise and 
Conclusion 
 
     What is hard to understand about Breen’s approach is his lack of will to maintain 
coherency about not only others’ views, but even his own. 
     In the preface, Breen refers to the “fact that rituals that the modern state imposed 
on shrines were, unlike the early modern period, all conducted for to justify the 
legitimacy of the emperor of unbroken lineage” (p. 7).   In his view, those rituals 
which have been held at shrines since the modern period are “all” for legitimization 
of the emperor of the unbroken lineage, and this is a “fact.”  
     Breen repeats his claim that this is a “fact,” and states in Chapter 6, “Jinja no 
Matsuri no Kindai—Kanpei Taisha Hie Jinja no Ba’ai” (The Modernity of Rituals at 
Shrines—The Case of Kanpei Taisha Hie Jinja, 官幣大社日吉神社) that “it was the role 
of Hie Shrine of Kanpei Taisha (large-scale state shrine) during the new era to 
narrate the myth of the unbroken Imperial line through rituals” (p. 252).   
     Breen’s purpose in Chapter 6 is to demonstrate that the origin of the Sannō (山王)  
Festival of Hie Shrine, which is said to be primitive and archaic, can in fact be found 
“in the Meiji Restoration of the 19th century” (p. 207).  The reason why Breen 
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focuses on the Sannō Festival is because he thinks that “it is no exaggeration to say 
that the Sannō Festival is the raison d’être of Hie Shrine (p. 206).   
     If that is the case, what is the result of examination about the Sannō Festival that 
is allegedly the raison d’être of Hie Shrine?  Here are Breen’s words: 
 
First, as for the deities enshrined of Nishihongū (西本宮), Ōnamuchi(大己貴神), 
has been consistently enshrined as the deity of Hie Shrine since ancient times, 
when Ōnamuchi  was ceremonially transferred from Miwa (三輪); however, it 
is no doubt that those enshrined today, except Ōnamuchi, were settled after the 
Meiji Restoration.  Based on the fact that Ōyamakui (大山咋神) appears in the 
Kojiki (古事記) or Records of Ancient Matters, one can presume that Ōyamakui 
became enshrined at Mount Hachiōji (八王子) before the ceremonial 
transferring of Ōnamuchi.  After that, due to ambiguous circumstances, 
Ōyamakui disappeared from Hie Shrine and was replaced with Kuni-no-
Tokotachi (国常立), which had been consistently enshrined until the Meiji 
Restoration.  Furthermore, the identities of deities other than Ōyamakui also 
drastically transformed after the Meiji Restoration.  Ōyamakui’s spouse 
Tamayori-hime (玉衣姫) also became an enshrined deity of Hie Shrine at the 
time of Meiji Restoration.  We must note that when new deities appeared like 
this, old deities left.  Not only Kuni-no-Tokotachi but also deities such as Ninigi 
(瓊瓊杵), Kuni-no-Satsuchi (国狭槌), Kashikone (惶根), Oshihomimi (忍穂耳), 
and Izanami (伊弉冊) became unnecessary to Hie Shrine and the Sannō Festival 
of this new era.  The main reason why these deities relinquished their shinza 
(神座,the seat of the deity) to the new deities is that they had nothing to do 
with the new story narrated by the Sannō Festival.  The new story is about the 
marriage between Ōyamakui and Tamayori-hime and their child’s birth.  It has 
become clear that this story has no relation with the Sannō Festival before the 
Meiji Restoration.  (pp. 251-252)   
 
Upon reading this, I became very confused.  This is because the deities that are 
essential to “the myth of the unbroken imperial line” such as “Ninigi”(the imperial 
ancestral deity Amaterasu’s grandson) and “Oshihomimi” (Ninigi’s father) left Hie 
Shrine along with the Meiji Restoration, and its reason is “these deities had nothing 
to do with the new story narrated by the Sannō Festival.”  Then, how can Breen 
claim, “It was the role of Hie Shrine as a Kanpei Taisha during the new era to narrate 
the myth of the unbroken imperial line through rituals”?  How can he say, “Rituals 
that the modern state imposed on shrines were, unlike the early modern period, all 
conducted to justify the legitimacy of the emperor of unbroken lineage”?  These 
should be contrary: “The new story that the Sannō Festival narrates was moving 
away form the myth of the unbroken imperial line.” “It was not Hie Shrine's role as a 
Kanpei Taisha during the new era to narrate the myth of the unbroken imperial line 
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through rituals.”  In other words, should not the conclusion be that “it can not be 
necessarily said that the rituals that the modern state imposed on shrines were, 
unlike the early modern period, all conducted to justify the legitimacy of the 
emperor of unbroken lineage”?  
 Could it really be that the author himself does not notice such self-contradiction?  
I considered the possibility that I might have misunderstood the meaning of “a new 
story narrated by the Sannō Festival,” but this was not the case.  My correct 
understanding is supported by Breen’s own words in the conclusion. 
 
If we ignore for a moment of our empirical investigation, this story, on which 
the contemporary Sannō Festival is based, is really primitive and seems to 
possess eternal characteristics.  It seems to be a myth all the more attractive 
because the story, as a myth invented under the modern state, is in quite a 
different dimension from the unbroken imperial line. (p. 245)   
 
     Breen’s own empirical examination negates what Breen assumes a “fact.”  This 
might be “attractive” to readers, but the author cannot be excused.  This is such a 
contradiction that Breen would be expected to deal with in detail.  However, for 
some reason, he appears to be completely uninterested.   
 
VIII. Again Avoiding Proof by Generalization and Losing Memory of the Basic 
Character of the Object of Study 
 
    At the end, let us return to the addendum.   In the addendum, Breen regards 
Yasukuni Shrine as a “site of memory” and states repeatedly, “The history that is 
narrated by memory is quite biased and distorted.”   He claims, “It is questionable if 
Yasukuni Shrine can be a site that commemorates the war dead, who devoted 
themselves their precious lives for various reasons” (p. 281).  Breen concludes the 
section: “There would be many advantages in the creation of a new national 
memorial” (p. 281).   
     Breen states that “this section identifies what kinds of memory Yasukuni Shrine 
shapes through what methods, and why it has to create such memory” (p. 263).  In 
order to do so, Breen examines the “memory” that Yasukuni Shrine narrates in the 
order of “ritual,” “display,” and “text.” (2)   
      First, in regards to ritual, Breen takes up ireisai (慰霊祭, rites of propitiation) and 
asserts that the purpose of the rites is “to repeatedly produce a sense of awe” (p. 
268) towards values that the war dead embody and that the emperor characterizes.   
Breen asserts that, under the values held by Yasukuni Shrine, the deaths of the war 
dead were “a tragedy to be lamented, but also a praiseworthy honor,” and that “the 
war, which ended in defeat, was nonetheless a meaningful and noble war” (p. 268).  
In this line of discussion, Breen raises the critique that “war memory like this should 
indeed be called myth rather than history” (p. 268).  By “myth”, Breen means a 
made-up story that distorts facts and supports this based on the fact that the “war 
memory of the Yasukuni Shrine’s ritual of propitiation comprises all those elements 
of myth defined by Paul Connerton: struggle, sacrifice, and redemption (through 
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death)” (p. 268).  His common pattern of avoiding proof by generalization can be 
seen here again.  Whether or not a “memory” of  “a praiseworthy honor” and  “a 
meaningful and noble war” is “myth” should be judged as a result of investigating 
many historical facts individually.  Breen's authoritarian method of simply applying 
one scholar’s generalization to serve his purpose must not be tolerated.  
     Breen argues that, since that the rites of propitiation of Yasukuni Shrine venerate 
“as glorious spirits only the military, civilians in military employ, and the 
paramilitary,” the rites are intended to “banish the sacrifices of the common man 
and woman from memory”; thus, Yasukuni Shrine “cannot be a national site of 
mourning” (pp. 268-269).  This is an argument that forgets the basic character of 
shrines—“shrines are sites constructed towards particular deities.”  If his argument 
is right, then it would mean that all shrines in Japan are sites intended to “banish 
from memory” all other non-enshrined deities.    
 
IX. Lack of Doubt towards Own View of History  
 
     As for “display,” Breen takes up Yasukuni Shrine’s “Yūshūkan war museum” and 
states, “there is one feature of the Yūshūkan museum which is, perhaps, unique; and 
that is the odd absence of the enemy” (p. 272).  He guesses the reason of this 
absence as follows: 
 
What the absence of the enemy achieves splendidly is the amnesia of defeat, 
of perpetration, of the vanity of war and of the horror of war.  If the spoils of 
war from the American, British, and Chinese forces and their articles are 
displayed, and the enemy is visible, then visitors cannot but associate them 
with the Japanese military’s perpetration, the damage, and the horror of war. 
(pp. 272-273)  
 
     Here again, his premise is wrong.  “Odd absence of the enemy” is not a “feature” 
limited to the Yūshūkan.  More or less, this is a common feature among war 
memorials in Japan.  One such popular example is the Atomic Bomb Cenotaph in 
Hiroshima, inscribed with its commitment: ‘Rest in peace, we shall not repeat the 
evil.’  Here, the “enemy” who dropped the atomic bombs was completely “sanitized,” 
“obliterated,” and “lost in memory” (3). 
     Breen provides these examples of memories that are “obliterated” by the “rites of 

























     The problem here is that, Breen never considers to critique the issues he thinks 
we should remember in terms of “selection,” “sanitization,” and “amnesia” of 
memory.  Without investigating his memory with historical materials, Breen keeps 
arguing on the premise that all are “facts” and “truths.”  In short, he completely lacks 
doubt towards the view of history that he upholds.  This is not just unfair but also 
inappropriate.  For it has been already pointed out that selection, exaggeration, 
concealment, and distortion of memory are involved in Okinawans’  widely-known 
fact that “the Japanese army literally used the civilian population as shields, 
eliminated them, sometimes murdered them with bayonets, and even drove many to 
acts of group suicide” (p.273)(4).  If Breen still wants to claim it as a “fact,” he should 
rely on the individual concrete research of history.  In addition, it is essential for him 
to investigate policies of the American Occupation that demanded “selection” and 
“loss” of memory from the Japanese. 
     Concerning the argument that the Tokyo war crimes tribunal was the “judgment 
of the winner,” Breen states that such an aspect “cannot be denied.”  While he 
admits that “it is an unmistakable fact that the imperialism of Europe and America, 
including the author’s own country, Britain, had been invading Asia since before the 
nineteenth century,” Breen dismisses this lightly without any further consideration.  
He avoids providing proof through his common method of generalization by saying, 
“even so, it does not necessarily mean that Justice Pal’s view becomes appropriate 
historical memory” without investigation.  Also, he brings up an argument that “it 
(European imperialism) does not erase the fact that the Japanese military 
committed a crime” (p. 274). But it is an argument that Yasukuni Shrine has never 
claimed before. By doing this, Breen tries to mystify readers.   
 
X. Overlooking Historical Context 
 
     Breen states: 
 
History as narrated by the rites of propitiation and reproduced in the 
exhibits on display in the Yūshūkan is intended to impart meaning to the 
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horror and the waste of war.  This is the result of the shrine officials' 
unwillingness or inability to face the emptiness of war, the deaths of the war 
dead, and defeat. (p. 275) 
 
     His speculation that the shrine officials intend to impart meaning to the horror 
and the waste of war as a result of their inability to face the emptiness of war, 
deaths of the war dead, and defeat is no more than a guess by overlooking the 
context of the postwar period in Japan.  Since I have argued this point in detail in the 
past, I will repeat only a summary here.   
     The Yūshūkan only positively set about telling own view of history very recently 
in 2002, in fact, after the total reconstruction of the museum.  The background to 
this is that an extremely negative view of Japan’s modern history, one which 
emphasized exploitation within Japan and unremitting aggression abroad, had been 
implanted in people’s minds through the Japanese public education system; this has 
resulted in a situation that can only be described as pathological.  Most Japanese 
children continue to be taught that the American dropping of atom bombs on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki could not be helped, since Japan had started the war in the 
first place.  They are taken on school trips to visit the Atomic Bomb Cenotaph, 
inscribed with its commitment: ‘We shall not repeat the evil.’  Some junior high 
schools even take pupils on trips to China expressly to visit the Nanking Massacre 
memorial hall.  It has reached the point that a negative view of history that is full of 
falsehoods continues to be imposed on students. 
     Confronted with this situation, Yasukuni itself felt that displays dedicated to the 
private honoring of war dead were insufficient; the shrine has favored exhibits that 
attached importance to the sort of historical view that till that time had remained in 
the background.  However, this change in attitude is an insignificant matter and a 
tiny resistance in view of the realities of places of education.  In fact, while schools 
that take pupils on school trips to visit the atom bomb museums in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki are countless, few schools take students to the Yūshūkan (5).   
 
XI. Fabrication of The Object of Criticism  
 
     While analyzing the “text,” Breen criticizes the “cornerstone theory” that it is 
upon the noble cornerstone (ishizue, 礎) laid by the 2,500,000 glorious spirits that 
the Japan of today stands, that you stand, and that your family stands.  In his view, 
“the claim that the war dead considered the postwar society ideal and died for 
democracy is preposterous” (p. 277).  This is based on his fabrication of an object 
for easy criticism, another example of his common method of formulating a counter-
argument against nonexistent claim.  In the “cornerstone theory,” post-war society 
is not ideal; however, Japan somehow managed to be able to survive and could 
attain economic prosperity.  This is because, as a result of WWII, the West could not  
but give up racism and colonialism, and the world became a place where free trade, 
which is essential for Japan’s survival, is guaranteed.  In this sense, even though 
there are cases that cannot impart meaning concretely to the war dead’s sacrifice 
individual, their sacrifice was greatly meaningful overall to the Japan of later years.  
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Therefore, we have to be grateful to the war dead for that.  This is the meaning of 




     Writing this article was a painstaking task.  It is because I had to reinvestigate the 
articles and historical materials which Breen uses as the basis for his arguments.   
     As I mentioned at the beginning of this article, Breen first determines his 
conclusion, combines theories and historical materials that correspond to his 
conclusion, and excludes from his scope those unmatched to his claims and logic.  
What is underlying in his methodology seems to be both Breen’s overconfidence 
towards his intelligence and his lack of respect for object of his study, other scholars’ 
work, and readers.  If he had a feeling of awe toward history, Breen would have 
never been able to develop an argument with convenient theories and historical 
materials only.  If Breen had a feeling of awe for scholars who constructed theories, 
it would have been impossible for him to misrepresent them.  If he had a feeling of 
awe for eyes of readers, he would have never been able to conceal some data.  If 
Breen were aware of a fact that it is human nature to select convenient memory 
unconsciously and that Breen himself is not an exception of it, without reflecting 
upon himself, he would have never been able to criticize object of study and other 
scholars. 
     Breen criticizes: “War memory that Yasukuni holds is not objective and not 
complicated one, but it is the memory that corresponds to virtue and morality of 
contemporary society and that serves it” (p 279).  However, Breen’s own essay is 
not objective and not complicated, which is correspondent to his sense of value, 
conclusion, and claim, full of fabrication, alteration, concealment, manipulation, and 
loss of memory.  Since he has gone so far like this, an issue is not methodology 
anymore.  Should not it be said that the level of ethics is in question? 
     I will leave this judgment to the readers and end this article with citation of the 
bible, which I always keep in mind as a humble admonition towards myself who 














(1) Takeda states the “characteristics” of the “ritual of the Charter Oath”: 
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First of all, the ritual of the Charter Oath was conducted by the emperor as a 
ritual where the emperor swore to the deities of heaven and earth of himself.  
It was a national ceremony to present establishment of the Imperial 
sponsorship and main principles of “the Charter” through the emperor’s own 
body.  Secondly, the ritual was a national ceremony conducted by the civil 
and military officials beyond the boundary of usual Imperial rituals.  It also 
meant great change of tradition of usual Imperial rituals in terms of the 
participation of various feudal lords in the ritual.  These lords not only 
participated in the ritual but also signed the Charter Oath and swore their 
observance of the emperor’s national policy (Ishinki Tennōsaishi no Kenkyū, p. 
179; The author underlines; When I inquired Mr. Takeda that the first 
underlined phrase must be a typo for “Imperial sovereignty” based on the 
context, I got his confirmation”). 
 
     Breen points out Takeda’s scholarly work and criticizes: “Takeda focuses on the 
priest and the enshrined deity too much, which results that the dimension of power 
remains hardly unexplored” ( Shintōshūkyō, vol. 184&185, p. 125); “Takeda 
overlooks a function of ritual of constructing power relation” (Breen 2011, p 87).  
However, as Takeda’s citation above shows, he does point out the function of ritual 
of constructing power relation by phrases of “Imperial sovereignty,” “conducted by 
the civil and military officials,” and “swore their observance of emperor’s national 
policy.” 
(2) When I use a quotation mark without page number after this section, basically, 
those are borrowed from Breen’s terms. 
(3) Justice of the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, Radhabinod Pal, who saw this 
Cenotaph, got angry and questioned why the Japanese apologize to the Japanese as 
saying that “We shall not repeat the evil” although it is America that committed an 
offence of atomic bombing.  Justice Pal deplored: “I did not imagine how deeply the 
Japanese got the impact of the demagogy of wartime-propaganda that it is all Japan’s 
fault, stigmatized at the Tokyo Trials.  It took over the Japanese’ souls.” “The 
influence of the Tokyo Trials is more severe than damage of the atomic bombing.”  
In response to a request of a Buddhist monk of Honshōji temple, Kakei Yoshiaki, 
who knew Justice Pal’s grief through news, Justice Pal wrote an epitaph inscribed on 
“Great Asian Earnest Wish Cenotaph” (Justice Pal ‘Declaration of Peace,’ Shōgakkan, 
2008, p. 214).   
 
For the peace of those departed souls who took upon themselves the 
solemen (solemn) vow at the salvation ceremony of oppressed Asia, Oh! Lord, 




     As for Breen’s “odd absence of enemy,” I have responded before as follows, but he 
did not pay attention to it: 
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What is typically overlooked in arguments that criticize  “the narration in 
Yasukuni” is the fact that Yasukuni is a facility for consoling the spirits of the 
deceased.  I don't know how it works in other religious traditions, but in 
Shinto funeral ceremonies, it is customary for prayers (norito, 祝詞) to 
introduce the history and achievements of the deceased and to single them 
out for praise.  There is surely no one who would take issue with that 
discourse, and insist that ‘unless you make mention of the negative side of 
the deceased, you will have failed to make a just assessment of them’.  When 
speaking of the hardships encountered by the deceased, it is simply not the 
done thing for a man to stress the evil deeds of his rivals; no civilized person 
emphasizes the wrongdoings of the enemy.  In brief, it goes against 
traditional Japanese religious sensibilities to introduce, or stir up, negative 
feelings of bitterness and hatred at a place whose purpose is consoling the 
spirits of the deceased.   
     Shinto priests and the majority of the Japanese people unconsciously view 
the Yūshūkan and its display of the exploits of the war dead with the same 
feelings as they might hear the prayers dedicated to the deceased at funerals.   
That being so, the focus of the exhibits at the Yūshūkan is placed on the 
positive significance of the lives of the deceased, and there is no emphasis on 
the existence of enemies (Nitta Hitoshi, “And Why Shouldn’t the Prime 
Minister Worship at Yasukuni?,” in John Breen ed., Yasukuni: the War Dead 
and the Struggle for Japan’s Past, Hurst, 2007, pp. 134-135).   
 
(4) Sono Ayako, Okinawa-sen, Tokashikijima ‘shūdanjiketsu’ no shinjitsu—
Nihongun’no jūminjiketsumeireiwanakatta (Truth of “group suicide’ of the battle for 
Okinawa and Tokashiki island—there was no military command of group suicide), 
Wakku, 2006.  (曽野綾子『沖縄戦・渡嘉敷島「集団自決」の真実―日本軍の住民
自決命令はなかった』).   This Sono’ literary work is a significant source that 
teaches us how really we should investigate and think a subject in order to 
overcome what Breen calls “myth.”  Not to mention her methodology, what is so 
interesting about her way of thinking is her argument by comparing between these 
two: the Jewish people’s evaluation about group suicide at Masada, the last base of 
the Jewish’s rebellion against Rome in 66 B.C. and the Japanese people’s evaluation 
about group suicide at the battle for Okinawa.   
(5) See Ishikawa Mizuho’s ‘commentary’ included at the end of Sono’s book shown 
above.   
(6) Nitta Hitoshi, “Kindai kokumin kokka ‘Nihon’ no imi kara kangaenaoshitemiyō” 
(Let us reconsider the meaning of Japan as a modern nation state), in Yasukuni jinja 
o dō kangaeruka (How do we think about the Yasukuni Shrine), Shōgakkan, 2001, p. 
133.  
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